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Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K
identical circles, with N > K  1. The players alternately choose these
locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to
secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face
a resource mobility constraint such that not all N locations can be placed in
the rst round. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and
otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that for K = 1,
the second mover always has a winning strategy in this game. In this paper
we show that with K > 1, the second mover advantage disappears as in this
case both players have a tying strategy. We also study a natural variant
of this game where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so
that in each round each player chooses a single location where we show that
the second mover advantage re-appears. We suggest some Nash equilibrium
congurations of locations in both versions of the game.
Keywords: Competitive locations, Disjoint spaces, Winning/Tying strate-
gies, Equilibrium congurations.
JEL Classication: C72, D21, D72.1 Introduction
The possibility and practice of choosing locations competitively in order
to maximize in
uence over sources that generate payos is widespread in
economics and politics. For example, retail rms compete over geographic
location of chain stores in order to capture a larger share of the market.
Political parties may set up party-oces or aliated bodies in order to
spread political in
uence over the electorate. In such situations, the ability
of players to maximize in
uence by choosing locations may depend upon
the order in which such locations are chosen, thereby bringing up issues
concerning the rst and second mover advantages.
Games involving choice of locations has long been an important area of
study in economics. The corresponding literature centers around the seminal
work by Hotelling [1929] which considers a prot maximizing rm's decision
about optimal location when the consumers are located uniformly on a line
segment. Subsequently, this was extended to the celebrated circular city
model in Chamberlin [1953] and later by Salop [1979]. While in Hotelling
[1929], Chamberlin [1953] and Salop [1979] simultaneous-move games are
considered, Prescott and Visscher [1977] and Economides [1986] study the
problem when rms are allowed to enter sequentially on a line segment and
circular city respectively to show that the outcomes of a sequential location
game can dier signicantly from those obtained in a simultaneous-move
scenario.
In some environments involving location games, players may have the
sole objective of being the one with the highest in
uence, as for example, in
a competition to win the race for establishing its product as the standard
product in the market, a rm may set shops to acquire patronage from a
majority of customers (like popularizing a software) which may then have
long term benets for the rm. In politics, having the highest ideological
1in
uence is a natural objective under plurality rules and political parties
locate their representatives in order to spread this in
uence. It is of partic-
ular interest in situations where voters have but a small cost of voting in
which case it is hard to justify voter participation and several papers try to
explain large voter turnouts by assuming that parties are able to in
uence
individual voters to join ideological groups. As put in Martinelli and Her-
rera [2006], voters are to belong to groups and groups are formed by leading
party activists (see also for example Shachar and Nalebu [1999] and Coate
and Conlin [2004]). While Martinelli and Herrera [2006] extend the existing
literature on how parties in
uence voters by forming groups through group
leaders to the case where these leader arrive endogenously from the popu-
lation, the game we study can be applied to situations where two existing
parties locate respective party leaders across the electorate to do the same.
With such objectives, it is important to nd specically a winning or tying
strategy for a player.
A recent work in this respect is a game of in
uence studied by Ahn et al.
[2004], where there are two players (rms or political parties) who are each
endowed with the same number of facilities (resources to set up a number
of shops or nance a number of party leaders) to locate (possibly in batches
of more than one facilities) on a circle in a sequential manner. In order to
win the game, a player must try to secure as much area as possible that
is closer to its locations than those of its competitor. Each player faces a
resource mobility constraint such that not all facilities can be located in the
rst round. They show that in such a game (to be described precisely in
section 2) where play must involve at least two rounds, the second mover
always has a winning strategy and the game would always result in a tie
if players were forced to end the game in a single round. In Cheong et al.
[2002] the existence of a winning strategy for the second mover is shown,
2even for a single round location game played on a two dimensional closed
plane. In Chawla et al. [2003] an upper bound for the size of the rst mover
disadvantage is provided in a game where rms compete to maximize market
shares and consumers are distributed over a d-dimensional Euclidean space.
A variant of the the above mentioned games of in
uence is where players
compete over a collection of disjoint areas in which locations can be placed.
To the best of our knowledge, this variant has not been studied so far and
there are many real life situations that suggest its importance. For example,
retail chains set up stores in dierent cities or countries. In politics, these
disjoint areas can represent dierent sections of the citizens with distinct
group-identities (like workers, students, or simply electorally disconnected
geographic neighbourhoods like districts and states) and to set up locations
in a given region can be viewed as an attempt by the political parties to open
political units (like politically motivated trade unions, district party oces
or students unions in academic institutions wth designated leaders) to spread
in
uence among target groups and increase favorable voter participation.
This paper adresses such location games on disjoint areas by extending Ahn
et al. [2004] to a family of disjoint circles. In what follows we shall abstract
away from parties and rms and simply refer to them as players. We are
not interested in studying any particular model in politics or industry, but
rather analyze the issue of stratgic in
uence in abstract. It is also important
to mention that all our results can be easily extended to any closed curves
rather than just circles.
We show that the second mover advantage as in Ahn et al. [2004] disap-
pears and the rst mover always has a tying strategy. We also show that in
any Nash equilibrim of the game, there must be a tie. We then extend this
game by making the resource mobility constraint more stringent so that in
each round, each player places exactly one location. In this extended game
3we show that the second mover advantage as in Ahn et al. [2004] reappears.
We also provide some characterizations of nal equilibrium congurations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we dene the
game. Section 3 states and proves our results. Examples of nal equilibrium
congurations are depicted in section 4 and the paper concludes in section 5.
2 The Multiple Circle game
The circle game studied in Ahn et al. [2004] has two players, called1 Red
(R) and Green (G) each having N points to place (or locations to choose)
alternately on a circle with R making the rst move. Moreover, (i) each
player must place at least one point in each round, (ii) in the rst round
when play begins, R cannot place all N points (perhaps because not all
resources are available at the beginning of the game), 2 (iii) the game ends
only after all players have placed all 2N points, (iv) at any round, the total
points placed so far by G cannot exceed that of R3, and (v) a location on the
circle cannot serve more than one points. This results in a sequential game
where roles (that is rst and second mover identities) cannot be reversed
and the number of rounds is endogenous and can be controlled by R subject
to the restriction that there must be at least 2 rounds. The objective of
each player, as in Voronoi games (a term coined by Ahn et al. [2004]), is to
maximize the total length of the curve that is closer to that player than to
1originally called White and Black in Ahn et al. [2004]
2requirements (i) and (ii) imply that N  2.
3This is basically a condition required to preserve the rst and second mover identities
over any play. These identites could be preserved even with the assumption that players
place equal number of points in each period. In this sense, the condition given in Ahn
et al. [2004] and used here is general and hence weaker. In Subsection 3.1 we shall study
a natural variant of this game where each player must place exactly one point in each
round.
4the other so that a player wins if and only if the area it secures is strictly
the largest one. Otherwise there is a tie. It is shown in Ahn et al. [2004]
that in this game G always has a winning strategy, though R can bring its
length of in
uence as close as that of G's. Our objective is to check if such
a second mover advantage prevails when there are more that one disjoint
identical circles. We now present these ideas and the nding in Ahn et al.
[2004] formally.
Let fR;Gg be a set of players, where R stands for Red and G stands
for Green. The game on the family of disjoint circles is dened by a pair
hN;fCjgK
j=1i, such that N > K  1 and fCjgK
j=1 is a family of K disjoint
circles. Notice that the game studied in Ahn et al. [2004] is the special case
where K = 1. Throughout the game each player p 2 fR;Gg will select a total
of N points on K circles. The set of points selected by R is   
SK
j=1 Cj
and the set of points selected by G is 
 
SK
j=1 Cj. Players re-arrive in
alternating sequence with R moving rst, and are in principle allowed to
place points in batches. Let  r be the set of points that R places in round
r  1 while 
r be the same for G. The game ends when all 2N points are
placed on the circles.4 We will use w 2   (b 2 
) to denote a point placed
by R (G) during the game. We will call points placed by the player R red
points and those placed by the player G green points.
As discussed above, the game has the following conditions:
1. j rj;j
rj  1 for every r  1.






ij for every r  1.
4Please note that we put no restriction on how players distribute these points across








The endogenously determined number of rounds in a given play of the
game will be denoted by Z. Obviously   =
SZ





Notice that the restrictions of the game imply that Z  2.
Let C be any circle and let (x;y) be an ordered pair of elements of C.
We will use (x;y) to denote the arc of the circle between x and y in clockwise
direction. Let a(x;y) 2 [0;1] denote an angle in clockwise direction between
hal
ines starting from the center of the circle and going through x and y
(we normalize an angle, so that a full circle has angle equal to 1). Then
d(x;y) = minfa(x;y);a(y;x)g is the angular distance between x and y.
Notice that d(x;y) = d(y;x) 2 [0;1=2]. Given an arc (x;y), the length (or a
volume) of (x;y) is a(x;y).
Given a circle Ck, let
AR(Ck) =








be a set of points of Ck that are closer to points placed by R on Ck than
to points placed there by G. Let AG(Ck) be the analogical set dened for
G. Notice that each of these sets is a nite set of arcs of a circle Ck. Let A
be a nite set of arcs and let V (A) denote the volume (sum of lengths, in
angular terms) of arcs in A. When the game ends, each player p receives a
score Sp equal to the volume of the set of arcs constituting the set of points





for p 2 fR;Gg. Given these scores, the payo of the players is up(Sp;Sq) =
Sp   Sq, where fp;qg = fR;Gg. We say that the game is a tie if Sp = Sq,
while player p wins if Sp > Sq. A strategy in general will be a contingent
plan for every possible history of the game. We do not need to dene this
6general notion formally although we lay out complete specications of the
strategies we report. We will use uppercase letters S, T, X, Y to denote
pure strategies. Strategy X is called a winning strategy (a tying strategy)
for player p if no matter what player q does, by using X player p guarantees
that Sp > Sq (Sp  Sq). Throughout the paper we will use the standard
notation mjn, to denote the fact that m divides n and m-n, to denote its
negation.
2.1 Some denitions and existing results
We rst develop some concepts and notations. Let C be a circle and let
P  C be a nite set of points on the circle. Then an arc (x;y)  C
such that fx;yg  P and (x;y) \ P = ? is called an interval. Now let
PR and PG such that PR [ PG = P be sets of red and green points of P,
respectively. Then an arc (x;y)  C such that fx;yg  PR (fx;yg  PG)
and and (x;y) \ PR = ? ((x;y) \ PG = ?) is called a red (green) interval.
An interval that is neither red nor green is called a bichromatic interval
and an interval which is not bichromatic shall be at times referred to as
a monochromatic interval in general. We will use rC (gC) to denote the
number of red (green) points placed on the circle C. We will also use IR(C)
(IG(C)) to denote the number of red (green) intervals on the circle C.
Given a circle C and a point x 2 C, an antipode of x is the point y 2 C
such that d(x;y) = 1=2. The pair of points fx;yg is called a pair of antipodes
of C. Let m be a positive natural number. Then the set of key positions5
on C determined by point x and m is the set
(C;x;m) = fp 2 C : a(p;x) = l=m, where l 2 f0;:::;m   1gg:
By the set of key positions determined by m we mean a set of key positions
5We use a term key position here for what was called a key point in the paper Ahn
et al. [2004]. We found the name key position somewhat more apropriate in our context.
7determined by m and some point in C. A point placed in a key position
will be called a key point and an interval formed by two key points will be
called a key interval.
Before presenting our results in the next section, we report the main
result from Ahn et al. [2004] for the case K = 1. Consider the following
strategy, S used by player G (where key positions are simply N equidistant
points on the circle:
Strategy S
if there is an empty key position left then
(a) place a point on s key position
else if if r < Z then
(b) place a point in the middle of a maximal interval of the opponent
else
(c) if there is more than one interval of the opponent then
place a point in the middle of a maximal interval of the
opponent
else if there is exactly one interval of the opponent and its length
is l then
place a point in a bichromatic key interval at distance less
than 1=N   l from endpoint of the opponent
Theorem 1 (Ahn et al. [2004]) Let hN;fCjgK
j=1i dene a game on a sin-
gle circle such that K = 1. Then S is a winning strategy for G although R
can always bring the dierence SG   SR as close as possible to zero.
83 Results
We rst show that for any game hN;fCjgK
j=1i with K  2 and N  K,
R, i.e. the rst mover, has a tying strategy. We will consider two cases
separately: K-N and KjN. We start by demonstrating a tying strategy for
R for the rst case. The general idea of this strategy is for R to capture key
positions on the circles. Key positions on each circle will be determined by
the rst point placed on the circle and either dN=Ke or bN=Kc, depending
on the situation (and G's play, in particular). Let r be a round and let L(r)
be the number of circles occupied after R places the rst of the points he is to
place in round r. Key positions on the occupied circles are determined with
respect to dN=Ke and the rst point placed on the circle. The number of
total key positions on these circles is L(r)dN=Ke and the number of vacant
key positions is
V (r) = L(r)dN=Ke   Y (r);
where Y (r) is the number of key position already occupied after R places
the rst point in round r. Let '(r) stand for the number of points R is
left with if after placing his rst point in round r he would have covered all
vacant key positions in the occupied circles, that is
'(r) = N   r   V (r):
We rst prove the following lemmas and a corollary, which are gener-
alizations of the lemmas presented in Ahn et al. [2004] for more than one
circle.
Lemma 1 Let fCkgK














if r = 1 then
place one point in some circle
else if r  2 then
(a) if at r   1 G played in a free circle then
place one point in that circle taking a key position (dened by
the position of the green point and dN=Ke
if (K   L(r))dN=Ke = '(r) then
take all key positions in the occupied circles and then
divide the free circles equally by taking key positions on
them with all remaining points
(b) else if at r   1 G played in the circle with at least one red point
and vacant key position, not taking a key position then
place one point in that circle taking a key position (dened by
the position of the red point and dN=Ke
(c) else if there is a circle with red points only and vacant key
positions then
place one point in that circle taking a key position (dened by
the position of the red points and dN=Ke
(d) else
place one point in a free circle
if (K   L(r))dN=Ke = N   r or (K   L(r))bN=Kc = N   r
then
divide the free circles equally by taking key positions on
them with all remaining points
10i.e. the dierence between the number if red points and green points placed
on the family of circles is equal to the dierence between the number of red
and green intervals on that family of circles.
Proof. In Ahn et al. [2004] it is shown that for any circle C it holds that














The following corollary is immediate from the above lemma.
Corollary 1 Let fCjgK
j=1 be a family of circles where each of the players R
and G placed the same number of points. Then the number of red and green
intervals is the same.
Lemma 2 Let fCkgK
k=1 be a family of circles with key positions with respect
to some M for each circle. Assume that (i) there are r =
PK
k=1 rCk  KM
red and g =
PK
k=1 gCk < r green points on the family of circles covering all
KM key positions and (ii) there is only one red interval which is not a key
interval. Then there exists a bichromatic key interval.
Proof. The argument used in Ahn et al. [2004] for an analogical lemma
for one circle works for this lemma as well. We have r + g  2KM   1
points on the circles and KM of them are key points. Thus there are at
most KM   1 points lying within some key intervals. This leaves one key
interval without a point. This key interval cannot be red, as there is only
one red interval which is not a key interval. The key interval cannot be
green, as by Lemma 1, this would mean that there are more then one red
intervals (notice that r > g). Thus the key interval must be bichromatic.
We now prove our rst main result by identifying a tying strategy called
T for R, the rst mover.
11Theorem 2 Let hN;fCjgK
j=1i dene a game on the family of disjoint circles
with K  2. If K-N, then T is a tying strategy for R.
Proof. We start by showing that strategy T is implementable. The
only situation, where the strategy may not be applied is the one where at
some round r, R faces the situation where there is no key position left (and
he is having e > 0 points left). This means that in each of the K circles,
dN=Ke key positions are taken (notice that if G does not take any key
position up to the round r, then this situation cannot appear). Let r0  r
be the last round such that at the round r0   1, G took a key position.
Observe that it must be that r0 = r, as R is able to cover all remaining key
positions at r. Consider R's move at the round r   1. Since R has enough
points to cover all remaining key positions at this stage, he would do that
and this contradicts the assumption that G places a point in a key position
at this round. Thus the strategy is implementable.
Now we will show that using this strategy either R wins or ties. Firstly,
observe that after R's move in the last round all key positions must be
covered. For assume throughout the game G did not take any key position
(this means in particular that G has never placed a point in an empty circle,
as such point is always a key position). Then at round (N mod K)dN=Ke+
16 R plays in an empty circle and he can cover bN=Kc key positions in each
of the remaining empty circles, so the game nishes and all key positions
are covered. Now assume that at some round r, G places a point in a
key position. Then R is still capable of covering all remaining key positions
towards the end of the game. Moreover after G's move, the number of circles
where R would have to take bN=Kc key positions decreases by 1. After G
takes K   (N mod K) key positions, R is capable of covering all remaining
key positions and at the and of the game dN=Ke key positions will be taken
6Notice that N = (N mod K)dN=Ke + (K   N mod K)bN=Kc.
12in each of K circles.
Secondly, observe that if G and R covered all key positions in L circles
(k key positions on each of the circles) using the same number of points,
and so that R's points are placed on key positions only then G cannot be
winning on these circles. This is because if G is to be winning then there
must be some green intervals on the circles (for if there are not then there
is a tie, as each bichromatic interval is divided equally between G and R).
According to the fact 1, there must be the same amount of red intervals.
Since each red interval is of size 1=k and each green interval is of size  1=k,
so G cannot be winning.
Assume that in the last round R played according to (d). Then before
R's move some 1  L < K circles were covered by G and R so that the
same amount of red and green points where placed there, all key positions
are taken and all red points are placed on key positions (and there are
dN=Ke key positions on each circle). Thus there is a tie on these circles.
There are two possible numbers of key positions on each of the K L circles:
(i) dN=Ke and (ii) bN=Kc. In case (i) the situation analogous to the one
on L circles will be created, resulting in a tie. For case (ii) observe that
answering R's move G has to place (K   L)bN=Kc points. Observe also
that after R's move (K  L)bN=Kc red intervals where created, each of the
size 1=bN=Kc. Since R cannot gain7 by playing in any of the L circles that
where occupied before R's move (as he can gain < 1=dN=Ke, and by playing
within newly created red interval he can gain 1=dN=Ke), he has to place his
points within newly created red intervals. Moreover by placing more than
one point within such interval he can gain < 1=bN=Kc while placing one
red point in each of the newly created red intervals he gains 1=bN=Kc and
in this case there is a tie.
7By \gain" we mean the area acquired by the player plus the area lost by the opponent.
13Now assume that in the last round R did not play according to (d).
Then at the end of the game we will have the situation where all circles are
covered with the same amount of green and red points, all key positions are
taken (dN=Ke key positions on each circle) and R placed his points on key
positions only. Then there is a tie.
Our next result deals with the case where K j N where we show that
R has a tying strategy in this case as well. The strategy is simple and is
therefore dened directly in the proof of the theorem. We shall refer to it
as T as well since its identity will be clear from whether KjN or not.
Theorem 3 Let hN;fCjgK
j=1i dene a game on the family of disjoint circles
with K  2. If KjN, then R has a tying strategy (which will be also called
T).
Proof. Observe that R can implement K=N red arcs of equal size on
each of the K circles by placing N points. To see this, consider the following
strategy of R (called T): place exactly N=K equidistant points in round r
on circle Cr. Obviously since Cr is continuous, G can always do that.
Thus at the end of the game both R and G placed the same amount N of
points in K circles. Moreover R points take N=K key positions determined
by a red point and N=K in each of these circles. If there is no green interval
on the circles then there is a tie. Observe that if there is a green interval,
then its size is always  K=N while each red interval has size K=N. Thus
if there are any green intervals, then by the fact 1 it cannot be that G won.
By Theroem 2 and Theroem 3 we have shown that if K  2, then R, the
rst mover, has a tying strategy in the game and hence the second mover
advantage present under K = 1 disappears. The question that arises now
is: can the rst mover do better? The answer is no as we show the existence
14of a tying strategy for the second mover as well, as stated in the theorem
below. This strategy, which we call T0, is simple and is as follows:
Strategy T0
place exactly one point in each red interval created by R in any given
round
Theorem 4 Let hN;fCjgK
j=1i dene a game on a family of K disjoint cir-
cles. Then T0 is a tying strategy for G.
Proof. Strategy T0 requires G to place exactly one point in each red
interval created in a given round. It is easy to see that this will ensure that
at the end of the game there is no monochromatic intervals, which is then
a tie. So what requires to be proved is that this strategy is implementable
which we do by induction on the number of the current round. We will
show two things: after R plays in round r, G can place exactly one point
in a red interval and there is no monochromatic interval after G's move.
Consider the rst round. There are no intervals before players move. Assume
that R placed m points. Then, by Lemma 1 there are m red intervals
created and G can place m points, one within each interval. Thus there
is no monochromatic interval after the rst round. Now consider a round
r > 1. By induction, there is no monochromatic interval before R's move
and, by similar argument as in the case of the rst round, there is exactly
the same number of newly created red intervals as the number of red points
placed. Thus G can place exactly one point in each of the newly created red
intervals and there are no monochromatic intervals after the round r. This
shows that G's tying strategy is implementable.
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of the results we
have proved so far.
15Theorem 5 Let hN;fCjgK
j=1i dene a game on the family of K disjoint
circles. Then strategy prole (T;T0), where player R plays T while player
G plays T0, is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in every nal
conguration resulting from this Nash equilibrium prole of strategies, (i)
there is no monochromatic interval on any circle and (ii) all red points lie
on key positions.
There may be other equilibrium points in this game. We shall use the
above equilibrium in the examples we set in section 4 to study equilibrium
congurations. We now deal with a variant of this game where the resource
mobility constraint becomes most binding.
3.1 \One-by-one" variant of the game
A natural variant of the game studied above is the one where players face
very strict resource mobilization constraints so that each places a single
point in each round. Recall that in the tying strategy T used by R, it was
crucial for R to place more than one point at some rounds. It turns out that
if players face such a strict resource mobility constraint as the one we are
dealing with now, then G, the second mover has a winning strategy.
The strategy, which we shall call Y , is a generalization of the winning
strategy S of the second mover in the one circle case presented in The-
orem 1. Player G rst tries to take key positions with respect to dN=Ke
or dN=Ke (depending on the situation described precisely below) and the
rst point placed on that circle. Then he breaks biggest red intervals, by
placing a point inside them. In his last move he either breaks the biggest
red interval or plays in a bichromatic interval that is bigger than the biggest
red interval.
16Strategy Y 
if there is an empty key position left then
(a) if there is an empty key position on the circle where the opponent
took a key position in his last move then
if there is only one point in that circle then
assign the number of key positions for this circle to dN=Ke
place a point on a key position in that circle next to the point
placed by the opponent on the clockwise side of that point (if
possible), otherwise on the anti-clockwise side (if possible)
otherwise anywhere else
else if there is an empty key position in a non empty circle then
place a point on a key position in that circle
else if number of empty circles L  K   N mod K then
place a point on an empty circle assigning the number of key
positions for this circle to bN=Kc
else
place a point on an empty circle assigning the number of key
positions for this circle to dN=Ke
else if if r < Z then
(b) place a point in the middle of a maximal interval of the opponent
else
(c) if there is more than one interval of the opponent then
place a point in the middle of a maximal interval of the
opponent
else if there is exactly one interval of the opponent and its length
is l then
place a point in a bichromatic key interval at distance less
than 1=dN=Ke   l from endpoint of the opponent
17Theorem 6 Let hN;fCjgK
j=1i dene a game on the family of disjoint circles
with N > K  2 and assume that players face a very strict resource mobility
constraint so that they are allowed to place exactly one point at a time. Then
Y  is a winning strategy for G.
Proof. Notice that, just as in the case of S, the use of strategy Y  leads
to the following three stages of the game for player G. First the option (a)
is excercised, until all key positions are covered (some of them with respect
to dN=Ke and others with respect to bN=Kc). Then the option (b) is
excercised, until G reaches a round where he has only one point left (since
the game is restricted, so that both players play exactly one point at each
round this will be at the round r = Z). Finally the last stage is reached,
where G plays according to (c). We start with two claims.
Claim 1 After the end of round (a), G has at least one point left.
Proof. Observe rst that key positions are taken either with respect to
bN=Kc or dN=Ke and N = (N mod K)dN=Ke + (K   N mod K)bN=Kc,
so a player is capable of capturing all key positions on all circles, taking key
positions with respect to dN=Ke on (N mod K) circles, the remaining key
positions with respect to bN=Kc on the remaining K   N mod K circles.
Since R places at least one point in a key position (which is the rst point
placed by him) and throughout the game G never assigns dN=Ke as the
number of key positions to more than N mod K circles that do not contain
a red key point (by checking each time when the green point is placed on
free circles as to whether the number of free circles L  K  N mod K), so
G will have at least one point left after all key positions are taken.
Claim 2 The number of red key intervals of size 1=bN=Kc is never greater
than the number of green key intervals of that size.
18Proof. This is because whenever R places a point in an empty circle, G
places a point there in the same round, assigning the number of key positions
for that circle to dN=Ke. Thus red key intervals of the size 1=bN=Kc can
be created only on the circles where G placed the rst point, and so after
all key points in each such circle are taken, G will take no less key positions
there than R. Moreover strategy Y  ensures that each red key point has
at most one neighbouring red key point (because G places a point next to
a newly placed red point, if possible, and starts by placing it on the same
side (clockwise in the case of strategy Y )).8 Thus the number of green
key intervals in such circles cannot be smaller than the number of red key
intervals there.
Now assume that all key positions are taken and R places a point.
Then there is one more red points than green points on the circles, and
by Lemma 1, there is at least one red interval. Thus the next move of G is
implementable and the game is either in stage (b) or (c).
Observe that in stage (b) G will place a point in all red key intervals
of size 1=bN=Kc (as he has at least twice the number of such intervals of
points left, and these intervals are being broken rst). Moreover G will place
a point in all red key intervals of size 1=dN=Ke in the stage (b) (as he saves
at least one point each time such interval is created by R). Notice also that
whenever R creates a red interval of the size  1=dN=Ke, this interval is
created by placing two red points within a green key interval of the size
1=bN=Kc and at most one red interval of this size can be created in such
green key interval. Since the stage (b) ends when both players have only
one point left, so all such intervals created in the stage (b) will have been
broken by G by the end of that stage. Thus after the stage (b) there is no
8The restriction on the game, so that players move one-by-one is crucial for this prop-
erty. Notice that this issue arises only when bN=Kc 6= dN=Ke, i.e. K-N.
19red interval of the size  1=dN=Ke.
Consider now stage (c), where both players place their last points. The
following situations are possible after R places his point in that round: (i)
there are two or more red intervals, or (ii) there is one red interval. Assume
that case (i) holds. Then G places a point in the largest red interval. If the
size of the newly created red interval was  dN=Ke, then the green point
was placed within this interval, as after the stage (b) there is no red interval
of the size  1=dN=Ke. Thus after the last round there is no red interval
of the size  1=dN=Ke. Since, also, by Lemma 1, there is the same amount
of green and red intervals and, moreover, each of green intervals is a key
interval (as by strategy Y , G never created a green interval apart from the
rst stage), so G must be winning (recall that the size of a key interval is
 1=dN=Ke).9
Now assume that case (ii) holds. Consider the situation before R's move.
It must be that there is no red interval. Consider the group of circles for
which dN=Ke key positions are assigned. It cannot be that R has more
points than G on these circles (as otherwise, by Lemma 1 there would be
a red interval there). Similarly R cannot have more points on the group of
the circles with bN=Kc key positions assigned. Thus on each such group of
circles, classied by the number of key positions, G and R have the same
number of points. Suppose that after R's move, a red interval is created in
the group of circles for which bN=Kc key positions are assigned (notice that
such red interval may have the size  1=dN=Ke). Then, by Lemma 2, there
must be a bichromatic key interval in that group of circles (i.e. a bichromatic
key interval of the size 1=bN=Kc). Thus G can win by placing a point in
that key interval and creating a green interval of the size bigger than the
9Notice that G's advantage may be arbitrarily small, as non-key intervals created by
R may be arbitrarily close in size to that of key intervals.
20size of the newly created red interval (which has the size < 1=bN=Kc).10
Analogically it can be shown that G wins when R creates a red interval
on the group of circles for which dN=Ke key positions are assigned.11 This
completes the proof.
Some footnotes used in the proof of the above theorem suggest that
although G, the second mover can win the game, R may be able to make the
dierence between their scores arbitrarily small. In the following theorem
we show that the winning strategy Y  for the second mover, with a slight
modication and called Y 0, can be used by the rst mover R to achieve this
independent of the strategy used by G.
A strategy X is a virtually tying strategy for player p if X is not a
winning strategy and for any " > 0, if player p uses X, then no matter what
player q does, player p can guarantee that Sq   Sp < ".
Theorem 7 Let hN;fCjgK
j=1i dene a game on the family of disjoint circles
with N > K  2 and assume that players face a very strict resource mobility
constraint so that they are allowed to place exactly one point at a time. Then
there is a virtually tying strategy for G.
Proof. Consider strategy Y  as dened before with option (c) replaced
by option (c') (this modied strategy will be called Y 0).
Y 0: Modication of Y  for player R
(c') place a point in a maximal bichromatic interval at distance " from
its green endpoint
10Notice that the advantage of G may be arbitrarily small and depends on how big the
red interval is.
11Analogical remark on the G's advantage applies here.
21We will show that if R plays according to Y 0, he achieves the required
outcome. Similarly to the case where Y  is used by player G, the use of
strategy Y 0 leads to three stages of the game for player R, though the stages
are slightly dierent. At rst, option (a) is exercised. After all key positions
become occupied, option (b) is used as long as there is a green interval. This
is the second stage. When there is no green interval, options (c') and (b) are
selected depending on what player G does. If in his move G breaks the red
interval created by the use of option (c') by R, in the next round R applies
option (c') again and creates another red interval. Otherwise (which means
that G created a green interval) R applies option (b) and breaks the newly
created green interval.
After the rst stage, where option (a) is exercised, R is not loosing. This
is because all his points lie in key positions. Moreover the number of red
key intervals of the size 1=bN=Kc cannot be greater than the number of key
intervals of this size (as red key intervals of the size 1=bN=Kc can be created
only on the circles where R placed the rst point, cf proof of Claim 2).
Hence if there are monochromatic interval after the rst stage, then all red
intervals are at least as big as the existing green intervals. Observe that
since N > K, so option (a) will be applied at least once and there will be
at least one bichromatic interval after the rst stage.
In the second stage, where option (b) is exercised, R breaks maximal
green intervals. Observe that throughout this stage after each move of player
R he has an advantage of size of a key interval (either of the size of 1=dN=Ke
or of the size 1=bN=Kc). Moreover G cannot create green intervals of size
 1=dN=Ke, as all key positions are occupied after the rts stage. Thus after
each round of the second stage player R cannot be loosing. This means in
particular that if G is a payo maximizer, the game will always enter the
third stage.
22In the third stage, whenever player R creates a red interval he is gaining
an advantage of the size of this interval. If G breaks the interval, the game
is in a tie again. Otherwise in the next round (if there is a next round) R
breaks the green interval, regaining his advantage. Now assume the game
is in its last round. Assume the length of the bichromatic interval within
which R created his last red interval is l. If G is to win, he must create
a green interval within a bichromatic interval of the size > l   " and the
created interval cannot be bigger than the red one by more than a margin
< " (as a maximal remaining bichromatic interval has size  l).
3.1.1 Nash equilibrium of the "-adjusted game
Since G wins for sure in the one-by-one variant of the game, that points
are be placed on continuous curves and no single point on a circle can be
served by more than one loctions, R does not really have an optimal strat-
egy. Hence, a Nash equilibrium in this version of the game does not exist.
However, strategy Y 0 becomes a dominant strategy for player R if we restrict
attention further to one-by-one games where R is not allowed to place his
points within a distance smaller than 1=dN=Ke  " > 0 to a green point.
This is because, as follows from proof of Theroem 7, just before the last
round R is not loosing and in the last round G can create an interval of
the size greater than the interval created by R, by at most ". With this
observation, the following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 8 Let hN;fCjgK
j=1i dene a game on the family of disjoint circles
with N > K  2 and assume that players face a very strict resource mobil-
ity constraint so that they are allowed to place exactly one point at a time.
Suppose also that R, the rst mover, is not allowed to place his points within
a distance smaller than 1=dN=Ke  " > 0 to a green point. Then strat-
23egy prole (Y 0;Y ), where the rst mover uses strategy Y 0 while the second
player uses strategy Y  is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in every nal con-
guration resulting from this Nash equilibrium there exists a monochromatic
interval.
We are obviously interested in the case where " is arbitrarily close to
zero. This theorem will be used to produce equilibrium nal congurations
in the one-by-one variant.
4 Examples
In this section we present examples illustrating the game when the players
use the strategies presented above. We start with general game where R
plays according to T while G plays according to T0. There are two cases
here: K jN and K -N. We illustrate only the second case, which is more
involved. Final congurations in the rst case are similar to those of the
second case if both players play these tying strategies.
Let N = 11 and K = 3. Player R starts by placing a point in an empty
circle (which denes key positions for this circle with respect to the red
point and d11=3e = 4) and G answers by placing a point in an empty circle
(taking a key position and dening remaining key positions for this circle
with respect to 4). The congurations created during the game are presented
in Fig. 1. We use empty discs to depict red points and lled discs to depict
green points. Key positions are depicted with short dashes intersecting the
circles. In the rounds 2{4 player R plays according to option (b) taking free
key positions in the rst circle while G places his points within red intervals.
In the round 5 player R plays according to option (d) taking a key position in
a new circle. This determines key positions in the new circle which are taken
with respect to the red point and the number 4 obtained as above. Player G
24responds by playing within the newly created red interval, R takes another
key position in the circle and G responds in the same manner. Since in round
6 player G placed his point in a key position, so player R plays according to
option (a). After he places his point, the number of occupied key positions
at round 7 is Y (7) = 8, the number of vacant key positions on non empty
circles V (7) = 0 and the number of points R would have left if he had covered
all vacant key positions in the occupied circles is '(7) = 11 7 0 = 4. Since
this is equal to (11 L(7))d11=3e = 4, player R can cover key positions with
respect to 4 in the remaining one circle, which he does. Player G answers
placing exactly one point within each newly created red interval. The game
is hence tied.
For the "-restricted one-by-one version of the game, we take the same
parameters and present an example where players apply their respective Nah
equilibrium strategies Y 0 (used by the rst mover Red) and Y  (used by the
second mover Green) (see Fig. 2). Player R starts by placing a point in an
empty circle (which denes key positions for this circle with respect to the
red point and d11=3e = 4) and G answers by placing a point in a clockwise
neighbouring key position (also assigning key positions for this circle with
respect to the position of the red point and 4). Then both players continue
with taking key positions. When key positions are taken (4 of them on
each circle) player R applies (c') of his strategy Y 0 and G responds applying
option (b) of his strategy Y  by breaking the red interval created by R.
The game goes on in this manner until the last round is reached. In the
last round player R applies option (c') of his strategy Y 0 again and player
G responds by applying option (c) of his strategy Y  and creating a green
interval slightly bigger than the one created by R in this turn. This ends the
game and G wins by the margin ", the dierence between intervals created
in the last round.
255 Concluding remarks
We have studied an extension of the two-player Voronoi game of Ahn et al.
[2004] to a playing arena involving multiple disjoint closed curves. Such
games can be used to model important real life situations as highlighted in
the introduction. We have shown that the second mover advantage, albeit
arbitrarily small as shown in Ahn et al. [2004], disappears as we nd tying
strategies for both the rst and the second mover, thereby enabling us to
demonstrate Nash equilibrium congurations of locations. A general prop-
erty of all such equilibrium congurations is that locations on each circle
alternate in colour. We then study a natural variant of this game where
players face very strict resource mobility constraints to show that the sec-
ond mover advantage, again though arbitrarily small, re-appears. In the
resulting equilibrium congurations of this version of the game, we show
that there exists monochromatic intervals, an interesting dierence vis-a-vis
equilibrium congurations in the original game. One may think of the rules
of the game as a mechanism by which distributions of in
uence between the
two acting players can be aected and in that sense we have shown that
a \literally fair" division is always Nash implementable. Ahn et al. [2004]
has also studied such location games on line segments and it would be in-
teresting to study our game on a family of disjoint line segments. Also, it
would be important to generalize our games to those involving more than
two players. Note also that the tying strategy of the rst mover that we
demonstrate depends crucially on the fact the the total number of points N
is known. It would be interesting to extend these environments to incom-
plete information.
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Figure 2: \One-by-one" game, N = 11, K = 3
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